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Abstract.  
In a new approach to a long-ranging debate on the causes of the Late Medieval 
Debasement, we offer an institutional case-study of Russia and the Levant. 
Avoiding the complexity of the “upstream” financial/minting centres of Western 
Europe, we consider the effects of debasement “downstream”, in resource-
exporting periphery countries. The paper shows the amazing synchronicity of 
the worldwide appearance of the early modern trading system, associated with 
capitalism or commercial society. The centre-periphery feedback loop amplified 
trends and pushed towards economic and institutional changes. This is 
illustrated via the Hanseatic-Novgorodian and Italian-Levantine trade – under 
growing market pressure of the exploding transaction costs, the oligopolies 
gradually dissolved and were replaced by the British-Dutch traders. In this case-
study the late-medieval/early-modern monetary integration served as the 
transitional institutional base for reducing transaction costs during a dramatic 
global shift. Highlighting centre-periphery links, a new trading outpost of 
Arkhangelsk rose synchronously with Amsterdam.  
 
 
Introduction.  
The hotly debated question of the causes for the Late-
Medieval/Early-Modern debasement produced two distinct hypotheses 
with variations in between. The first stresses the greed of princes, 
profiteering from their seigniorial rights to mint. Through this simple 
devise they gained twice, both from debasing and taxing their mint’s 
output. Meanwhile, the second hypothesis highlights the need to 
monetize a growing array of trading goods with limited supplies of silver, 
essentially inelastic until the 1540s1. This need was fuelled and made 
                                                 
1 “…innovations in both mechanical and chemical engineering that produced the South 
German silver-copper mining boom, which quintupled Europe’s silver supplies from the 
1460s to the 1540s, when even cheaper supplies of silver were arriving from the 
Spanish Americas.” (Munro 2006) 
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urgent by fairs of the 13th century, Hanseatic bulk trade of the 14th century 
and the globalization of the 15th-17th centuries (Findlay, O’Rourke 2007). 
While both explanations seem perfectly legitimate and supporting 
examples exist both ways, the second factor appears strengthening after 
the 1440s. A growing body of research provides support for a growth in 
the monetary integration of the prominent financial centres in Germany 
and Italy (Volckart 1996).  
Technically, however, the separation of the two hypotheses cited 
above presents significant difficulties, as long as the research remains 
confined to the vantage point of commercializing and industrializing 
Europe. It is hard to procure the right datasets from its past, with proper 
controls for the many variables in the complex and fast changing situation 
of the Late Middle Ages. This increases the ambiguity and decreases the 
traceability of possible causal effects. Apparently, this calls for a new 
approach which would considerably widen the datasets from a new 
vantage point.  
In this sense, an addition of a complementary case-study of 
resource-exporting countries of the-then periphery, Russia and, to an 
extent, the Levant, seems to be offering significant benefits. First and 
foremost, it appears to be free of the cited technical constraints of 
distinguishing between the princely greed and the market-based need to 
increase monetization. For example, the Novgorodian Republic minted its 
official coin only in the 1420-1456. Also, the Novgorodian traders 
accepted the debased Prussian Mark, at least, up to the 1420s, when it 
basically lost its value. These two facts, taken together, seem to be 
hinting at their need to monetize their goods.  
The available data shows that not only was the Novgorodian 
Republic trying to monetize its then most prized good, the northern 
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squirrel pelts2, but it also went to a great trouble in order to develop a 
highly sophisticated, wide-reaching and cost-efficient infrastructure to 
collect and deliver them. Then, during a deflationary downturn, the 
collapse of this highly specialist trade spelled trouble for the Republic. At 
the end, it was absorbed into the Muscovy after wars with 
Lithuania/Poland over ownership. The significant war indemnity payments 
sent its dwindling treasury funds first to Lithuania then to the Muscovy3.  
However, using Russia as a case-study necessitates introduction of 
a different sort of controls –for geographical exclusivity. In order to assure 
that the Novgorodian-Hanseatic trade was representative of the period 
and not a quirk, we take a brief look far south, at the Levantine trade with 
the Italian cities, first and foremost, Venice. It turns out that, after a period 
of falling gold weights of the dinar, in the 1420s sultan Barsbay of Cairo 
struck a new gold coin (ashrafi or new dinar) equal to the ducat, 
underscoring the ongoing integration of Egyptian-Venetian trade4. 
Preceding this, but nearly synchronously, the florin was also made equal 
to the ducat and the Florentines asked to make it legal tender in Sultan’s 
dominions. (Ashtor 1983: 277). Thus, just like Novgorod, the Levant 
                                                 
2 Other items in the Novgorodian trade, such as wax, at about half of squirrel pelt value, 
moved in price synchronously. 
3 In 1428 Novgorod paid Vitovt 10000 roubles. In the 1440s, a war broke between 
Novgorod and the Livonian Order (immediately following the Teutonic Order’ 1410 loss 
at the battle of Grunwald). The Hanse abandoned Peterhof for 6 years (1443-8). 
Muscovy’s Vassily II – 1441 (8000 roubles)  1456 Vassily Temny (Blind) received a 
huge (unspecified) indemnity and acknowledgement of his suzerainty. In a series of 
wars from 1470 Novgorod attempted to join Casimir IV of Lithuania and Poland, and, 
after being defeated by the Muscovy, paid war indemnity of 15500 roubles. Several 
revolts ensued after annexation, in 1479-88, and were punished by removal of the 
richest families to Moscow, Vyatka etc. The enormity of this sum of 35000-40000 
roubles can be gauged by comparing it against fur prices, which, at 3 dengas per pelt 
would add up to 2-3 million pelts. Consider also that the entire sum of Mongolian taxes 
is estimated at annually about 5000 roubles, progressing to 15000 roubles at Dmitry 
Donskoy time of the 1350s, when his growing difficulties of paying the assessments are 
considered by some as contributing to the decline of the Golden Horde, with the Great 
Troubles from 1359, disintegration in the 1420s and the fall from the 1480s.    
4 Note that the earlier dinar, weighing about 4.25 grams of gold was modelled after the 
Byzantine solidus, thus reflecting an earlier occurrence of market integration, always a 
good means to reduce transaction costs. 
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hardly could maintain its monetary independence and may thus be 
considered relatively controlled from the fiscal side. Also, in the manner of 
Russia, the Levant served as an export-driven periphery to the Venetian 
financial centre – sitting amidst the ailing domestic economy, the sultan of 
Cairo grew increasingly dependent on the highly specialized spice trade, 
which he tried to control as a royal monopoly until his efforts failed due to 
deflation.   
So, despite the great distance between these geographic localities, 
both Russian and Levantine trades were based on niche specialization – 
cantered at northern squirrel fur versus spices. Both of these localities 
served as export-driven periphery to the European financial centres, the 
Hanse and Venice, respectively. The patterns of their trade evolved 
synchronously, demonstrating a strong feedback loop-type relationship 
between the periphery niche traders and the network of the European 
financial centres of that time. 
 
 
I. A Case-Study of Exporters from the Periphery – Russia and 
the Levant. 
I.1 Deciphering the Late Middle Ages/Early Modern Era Market 
Shift Through Processes on the Periphery.   
As argued above, addition of new datasets culled from the 
periphery countries provides a different vantage point complementing the 
extant datasets, which trace the coin debasement in Germany and Italy. 
The central dilemma between the princely greed and market-driven 
monetization may now be reformulated as follows: what were the direct 
effects “downstream” in the resource-producing periphery caused by 
monetary actions taking place “upstream” in the financial centres of that 
time. Using our case study, we show that the European silver 
debasement from the 1300s and up to the 1440s had direct and well 
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traceable effects on the Novgorodian squirrel fur trade. First, it 
dramatically expanded to compensate for the losses through scale and 
better price differentiation through the introduction of finer grades. Then, it 
collapsed under the weight of a creeping deflation5. Similar effects were 
noticeable also in the Levant. In the 1410s the sultan used his monopoly 
to raise spice prices. Afterwards, in the 1440s, high prices could not be 
supported anymore in the overall deflationary climate and collapsed6. 
Thereafter, in Russia, the introduction of the Joahimsthaler from the 
1510s7 offered a more stable base for the next attempt of monetary 
integration. Among other things, the relative monetary stability lowered 
transaction costs for the Russian foreign trade of the Late Middle Ages. 
The 1535 monetary reform of Elena Glinskaya8, the mother and the 
regent for Ivan the Terrible, was built on the strength of the Joahimsthaler 
(well known in Russia as the efimok) and helped in integrating the 
Russian and the European monetary space9. In the 1580s, after the 
                                                 
5 Squirrel fur fashion starts at the end of the 13th century with fine scarlet woollen 
cloaks. Among known lovers of northern squirrel fur: Henry III (1216-1272). Edward I 
(1272 to 1307) Edward III (1327-1377) Henry IV (1399–1413), his daughter, Philippa of 
England wore squirrel during her 1406 marriage to Eric of Pomerania, King of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
6 Price of pepper rose greatly from 1410, remained high in the 1420s, reached a new 
peak in 1423-5 120-130 dinars, then fell from 1428 until the 1440s, with higher prices in 
the 1430 due to manipulations of the sultan, who sold the 70ashrafi good to Europeans 
for 100 ashrafi. The prices went down in the mid 15th century. (Ashtor 290). 
7 Due to the introduction of better mining and refining technologies, including the 
advanced amalgamation of the saigerprocess etc (Blanchard 2001) 
8 Such monetary reforms, taking advantage of the better availability of bullion, were 
hardly confined to Muscovy, which underscores the widespread need for monetary 
stability. If, in a locality, there was a better availability of silver, then silver was used, as 
in the Muscovy, if gold then gold, as it happened, for example, in Poland, which had 
good access to the Hungarian gold. In 1526, the Zloty system was introduced. The 
“Red Zloty” or “Polish Ducat” was minted of 3.5 grams of gold, with the silver zloty at 
23.1 gram. Then, in 1569, to bridge the gulf between the separate gold and silver 
coinages, a silver “talar” was also introduced. This was equivalent to one red zloty, or 
to eight “silver zlotys”… On this scale, one dollar or ducat was worth 240 groszy or 4 
320 pence. (Davies 1981: 130) 
9 The Russian monetary system after the reform of Elena Glinskaya was based on the 
small silver coin, presumably aiming at the promotion of local trade. The main coin was 
the novgorodka of 0,68 g. Afterwards, there were also moscovkas, at half the value or 
0,34 g and polushkas, halved again at 0,17 g. The full system was fixed in the Trade 
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Novgorodian fur trade failed, there was a pronounced shift to a new 
trading pattern with English and Dutch merchants, with the centre in 
Arkhangelsk and a new basket of vital goods for the bulk trade – cordage, 
tar, tallow, train-oil along with true luxury fur, such as sable etc. 
Simultaneously, the luxury fur was also sent to the south, to the Black 
Sea port of Caffa, held by the Ottomans.   
In this context, the use of extant Russian/Levantine data seems 
promising for tracing both failures and successes of the monetary 
integration at different stages of the increasingly global trade from the 14th 
to the 17th centuries. The case-study highlights the rise of a new and 
more efficient early modern trade system based on freer markets and 
bulk trade as the raison d’être of the rise of the early modern nation-state, 
able to protect extensive trade routes. It came as a replacement for the 
earlier market segmentation practiced by such externally linked 
oligopolistic bodies as the Hanseatic League/the Novgorodian Republic or 
Venice/Levant. Their mutual dependency could hardly be hidden under 
their nearly casual hostility. 
At the very start of the process, during the growth of the High 
Middle Ages, the attempts to resolve worsening shortages of supplies 
opened up a larger trading zone. From the 14th century, the rising 
Hanseatic League (trading in salt-fish, wax, amber, furs, grain etc) 
appeared as an adequate early attempt to alleviate these shortages. The 
Baltic trade was essentially monopolized in order to reduce transaction 
costs through a precise balancing act of supply-demand networks.  
Just as predicted by Coase (1937) hierarchies thus gained an edge 
at specific points, helping to save, through long-term contracts and 
delegation to authority, a portion of costs associated with market 
                                                                                                                                               
Book of the 1570s: 1 rouble=2 poltinas=10 grivnas=100 novgorodkas=200 dengas or 
moscovkas=400 polushkas. 
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operation, since the latter is more than zero. Williamson (1985) found 
asset specificity as a major factor sustaining hierarchies. Both asset 
specificity and long-term contracts were central for medieval oligopolies. 
They efficiently joined buyers and sellers together in an intricate mutually 
dependent network, fully dedicated to locating, mustering and then 
delivering all the available supplies in the most cost advantageous way 
possible, in order to satisfy the thirsty market. However, they paid for 
these efficiencies by increasing their internal rigidity. As supplies 
improved with the entry of new producers, the economic conditions 
gradually evolved to shortages of demand in the Late Middle Ages 
following the Black Death as shown in Figure 1 below. The oligopolistic 
bodies built to deal with supply shortages were ill equipped to handle this 
new task.  
The strain of demand shortages evolved slowly and gradually until 
it brought the Hanseatic-Novgorodian trade system to the near collapse 
after the mid fifteenth century. The Hanseatic League closed its 
Novgorodian kontor in 1495. When it reopened in 1514 the main issue of 
contention was the Muscovite insistence that “the Germans pay for 
Russian goods with silver rather than salt. Lübeck’s ambassador in 1510 
responded that the Hanseatic merchants could not possibly afford to pay 
for the “hemp and tallow and other goods” they bought exclusively with 
silver. Significantly, fur was not among the items at the top of his 
shopping list”. (Martin, 1986: 84). This dispute underscores the shift of the 
composition of the trading basket to the new list of preferred goods of the 
bulk trade era. Also, the gradual fading of the Novgorodian trade 
highlights the difficulties of specialized monopoly traders unable to adjust 
to the new and shifting reality and thus losing market share to new trading 
centres. Synchronous developments took place also in the Levant. For a 
while, the spice prices held, due to the frantic efforts of sultan Barsbay to 
maintain trade monopoly, as he charged the Venetian traders 100 
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ashrafis for a good with a local price of 70 ashrafis (Ashtor 1983: 292). 
However, this could not hold for too long. Ashtor testifies that abundance 
of spices led to declines in their prices amidst the deflationary trend of the 
near eastern economies, which contributed to decline in demand for 
these relatively costly articles. (Ashtor 1983: 290)  
Obviously, a freer market would have presented a viable and more 
flexible alternative to the monopolistic approach of the Novgorodian-
Hanseatic or Venetian/Levantine trade, but only if it were possible to 
adequately increase the monetization of goods. If successful, this would 
have been based on an even better reduction of transaction costs as 
compared to the Hanse or Venice. The increased flexibility, gained by the 
use of various free-market tools including market integration, should then 
provide sufficient benefits to compensate for market costs as an 
institution mentioned by Coase (1937). The preliminary data seem to 
support the gradual spread of a freer market. Russia eventually 
established a new type of bulk trade in cheaper goods, with a centre in 
Arkhangel’sk, which started trading with Amsterdam and London from the 
1580s.  
Note that, both economically and politically, this presented a shift to 
the early modern era and nation-states, instead of the earlier trading cities 
in Italy and the Hanse based on monopolies. In this sense, the 1420-40s 
presented an important junction in this slow and gradual development, 
which was synchronously felt over wider expanses. During the deflation of 
the 1420s, Cairo, its own industries faltering, took in inexpensive 
European textiles brought-in by the Venetians at the later stages of its 
waning spice trade (Ashtor 1983: 326)10. The Russian squirrel fur trade 
                                                 
10 “The decline of prices of various commodities was a striking feature of the economic 
life, so that the European merchants, among whom the Venetians were most 
prominent, had to lower the prices of the European cloth they marketed in the Near 
East and to offer cheap articles. Almost all the data concerning the prices of European 
cloth sold in Egypt and Syria in that period point to a slow decline. The German cloth 
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virtually disappeared at this very time, victim to the redirection of scarce 
funds to luxury furs and vital goods of the bulk trade era – sable, cordage, 
train-oil, tallow, potash etc. Thereafter, the rise of Amsterdam produced 
direct reverberations felt globally. Instead of Novgorod, the earlier trade-
post with the Livonian Order, there was now Arkhangelsk (the 1580s) 
providing cheap access to the goods from the Urals and Siberia to the 
English and Dutch merchants coming from London and Amsterdam. Of 
course, this new trade was supported by the appearance of a much more 
stable monetary system, based in Amsterdam and then London.               
 
I.2 Russia, a Case-Study for the Late Medieval/Early Modern 
Boundary.  
As it is usually the case with historical datasets, the availability and 
the integrity of information presents a major problem. This may be 
alleviated, to a degree, by juxtaposing several sources, in order to control 
for their unavoidable incompleteness and ambiguity. 
  For Russia, among those most promising:  
• numismatic data on the fineness of the excavated coins in the 
excellent collections of the Hermitage in St. Petersburg and the 
State Historical Museum in Moscow;  
• cadastres of 1496 and 1563 for select fur-grain producing areas, 
such as the Obonezhskaya Piatina;  
• tax data levied by the Muscovy in the 1550s, as it, following several 
revolts, overtook the earlier Novgorodian estates – this set of data 
highlights a dramatic shift from fur to grain and cash collection11; 
                                                                                                                                               
that the Venetians offered in the Moslem Levant was generally very cheap, and this 
certainly was also true of the Polish cloth. Another phenomenon was the spread of the 
use of English cloth”. (Ashtor 1983, 326).  
11 The payment books for taxes were compiled in 1555-6 for Kargopol’, Turchesov, and 
the Dvina land (1552-3 and there also was a revision in 1559 (Martin 152). 
 9
• account books of particular Hanseatic merchants (Olrik Elers, 
Fekinguzen, Vahendorn etc) and records of select trading ships. 
This data was extensively published, especially in Russian (see the 
list as an attachment to bibliography); 
• for select years, there are relative fur prices in Novgorod and Reval 
or Dorpat, in the Prussian Mark, the Mark of Lubeck and of Riga, 
and the Novgorodian rouble. The latter served as a unit of value 
measured through its content of silver12. 
 
In its turn, these data sets can be somewhat controlled for 
incompleteness by introducing additional lines of complementing 
information, including, but not limited to:     
• assessments of silver paid in taxes to the Mongol overlords in the 
1320s (Ivan Kalita, ruling 1325-40) and the 1350s-80s (Dmitry 
Donskoy)13 
                                                 
12 According to Martin, prices in Novgorod gradually rose, which may in part or whole 
reflect the ongoing debasement. This can be used to compare the relative speed of 
debasement and price appreciation to gauge for price stickiness vs money neutrality. 
Schoenewerke, anigen, lushwerke are different, specifically Novgorodian  grades of 
northern squirrel fur, listed from the finest down.  
1399  1402-3  1403-4 
1000 schoenewerke 9.35 NR 9.5 NR  9.7 NR 
1000 anigen  8.4 NR  8.6 NR  8.7 NR 
1000 lushwerke  7.5 NR  7.6 NR  7.7 NR 
13 According to Kuchkin, in the 14th century, the Mongolian tax to Moscow princedom 
amounted to1000 roubles. At the end of the 14th century, the former Dmitrov, Galician, 
Vladimir princedoms, now united under the Moscow prince, paid about 5 000 roubles. 
He assesses the entire sum of Mongol taxes from Russian principalities as equal to 15 
000 roubles. If correct, this is an enormous sum.  1 rouble in Pskov, where land was 
relatively poor, could buy 750- 3900 kg of grain (47-243 pud depending on the annual 
harvest). The rouble of the 15th century is lower than rouble of the 14th century. 
According to Kuckin’s estimate, in 1384 Dmitry Donskoy’s taxes amounted to about 2 
tons of grain from each Russian village, at that time, comprising only about 1 to 3 
household. (Kuchkin 1991: 22). This was the high point of the Golden Horde. “By the 
end of the century, especially after Timur’s attack and the destruction of the east-west 
trade route through Sarai in the 1390s, Sarai’s capacity to attract northern fur 
correspondingly declined.” (Martin 100). This was only for the good. “Muscovite 
merchants, building upon contracts made under the shadow of Sarai, developed direct 
trade with the Italian merchants of the Crimean colonies.” (Martin 100). In this way, a 
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• significant loss of profitability of former fur-producing estates as 
they were being switched to grain, to a lesser degree, cash, and 
also bequeathed to monasteries; 
• war indemnities paid by Novgorod to Muscovy, which are listed in 
the footnote 1.      
 
An especially intriguing set of data was preserved through the 
names of various tax components. As it happens, the Muscovy 
administration continued to levy cash taxes using the older Novgorodian 
names, such as the bel and the gornostal, as a substitute for the earlier 
taxes charged in squirrel and ermine correspondingly. However, it also 
levied new taxes, whose titles stress both the new administrative 
structure of more recent areas under its control and provide the ratios for 
the related expenses. Among them: defence-related taxes (pischalnye – 
harquebusier), postal taxes (yamskie), chancery expenses 
(kaznacheevskie – treasury), bookkeeping taxes (dyachie i podyachie – 
dyak and podyachii denote administrative titles) etc14. Studying their 
relative ratios along with their geographic and chronological spread as 
compared to the older fur-based bel and gornostal offers a unique 
opportunity for tracing the radiation of the early modern state of the 
                                                                                                                                               
more efficient oligopolistic system, built by Italian cities, superseded the less efficient 
one of the Mongols. 
14 Old taxes (stary dokhod) 1470s, immediately before the takeover by the Muscovy in 
1478. New records (novoe pis’mo) 1496. The taxes recorded in 1552-3 – bel and 
gornostal. (kopanev) were the carryovers from the Novgorodian times. After new, 
muscovite taxes were added, they together accounted for 65%  of all taxes. In the mid 
16th century, belka and gornostal were counted in cash – 3 dengas for bel and 7 
dengas for gornostal (Martin, p. 75). Muscovy taxes had a clear bureaucratic bent – 
postal (yamskie), arquebus (pischalnye), treasury (kaznacheevskie), administrative 
(diachie I podyachie), per plough (pososhnye). In the seven taxable units per village 
(pogosts), for which data on the rent paid to the Novgorodian boyars are known, it was 
on average 6 squirrels per person, 11 per household, 9.5 per taxable unit per family 
(obzha) (Martin 77). After the reopening of the German kontor in 1514, the bulk of trade 
through Reval to Europe was in hemp, flax, tallow, cable-yarn, train oil, wax, honey and 
hides (Attman 107, Martin 84). Payments in the 1530s to Olrik Elers were recorded in 
salt, tin, cloth and silver.  
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Muscovy as it gradually replaced the older Novgorodian system of the 
Hanseatic trade.  
While the thorough collection, evaluation and cross verification of 
possible datasets is still in the future, there is already a rich assortment of 
preliminary publications and credible econometric assessments hinting at 
their potential promise. A selection of those is provided at the end of our 
bibliography.   
Meanwhile, the size of northern squirrel fur-based market can 
hardly be overestimated. For example, Janet Martin calculates that 
Novgorod rent+tax mechanism supplied a minimum of 200,000 squirrel 
pelts per year in the third quarter of the 15th century, when the market had 
already markedly declined. Testifying to the gradual loss of the fur trade 
profitability and importance, a substantial number of boyars disposed of 
their estates during the 15th century, often transferring them to 
monasteries, which didn’t participate in the fur trade system (Martin 1986: 
157). This can be compared to the earlier data on the trade. For example, 
in 1393 one ship of captain Dubbelson was carrying over 225,000 pelts.  
(Martin 1986: 159). Martin estimates that, overall, the peak supplies could 
be easily two or three times more than that. At the height of the fashion, 
England alone consumed hundreds of thousands of northern squirrel 
pelts annually – perhaps, this data can also be located through British 
sources, while German sources need to be consulted on monetary flows 
and the level of debasement of specific coins.    
The datasets for the Levant may be preserved even better as 
shown by Eliyahu Ashtor (1976, 1983), our main source on the Levant for 
this paper.  
 
I.3 The Synchronicity of Russian-Levantine Developments.  
We use these preliminary data for studying the notable increase in 
market-flows at the dawn of the early modern era. Swift changes distinct 
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for that period were felt strongly in Russia, a periphery country. Due to its 
dependency on inflows of silver15, which then came from Europe, it was 
extremely sensitive to supply-demand shifts. The suitability of the Russian 
data for a case study on market integration comes from the fact that, in a 
nearly monocultural economy based on fur exports, Russian 
developments amplified global trends and made them even more 
pronounced and easier to see. Not infrequently, a sneeze at the monetary 
centre produced pneumonia for the resource-exporting periphery.  
Our chief hypothesis is that, among other things, events and 
processes taking place in Russia reflected a dramatic switch, originating 
in the Western Europe and spreading out to its faraway neighbours. 
During the 14th century, Europe was in a tumultuous equilibrium, while it 
was experiencing a shift from shortages of supplies to shortages of 
demand. The supply shortages (especially on food and fuel) were acutely 
evident during the famine of the 14th century, but, assumedly, 
accumulated from as early as the 13th century as a side effect of the late 
medieval demographic and economic growth (Fischer 1996: 4). A switch 
to demand shortages can be related to a huge drop in population in the 
14thcentury. Synchronously, the growth in monetization of the globalizing 
trade (Findlay O’Rourke 2007) amidst a drop in the European silver 
production (Blanchard 2001) caused desperate thirst for silver in order to 
invigorate trade, perhaps, a factor in geographic explorations. Silver 
shortages in the Hanse culminated in the 1420s-40s and were 
accompanied by widespread debasements (Volckart 2006).  
 
                                                 
15 Thomas Noonan points out that dirhams appeared in the Eastern Baltic before the 
Rus’, who, as may be surmised, were attracted by the kufic silver. (Noonan??)  
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Figure 1. Population and Wages, 1210-1500 
Source: Clark (1998). 
Note: Carpenters wages are in pence per day, normalized to the prices of 1300-49 
using an index of agricultural prices. 
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Figure 2. Price Index, England and Wales 1200-1500.  21 years Sliding 
Averages.  
Data source: (Clark 2003) 
 
Figure 3. Pepper prices in Alexandria, 1350-1498. Sliding Averages. 7 
years.  
Source of data: Ashtor 1983: 167-9, 313-5.  
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Figure 4. Price Index, England and Wales 1200-1500.  Sliding Averages. 
21 years.  
Data source: Clark 2003.and Ashtor 1976, 1983 
 
In the Levant there was a synchronous development, as shown in 
Figure 4 above. “The upswing of the Levant trade of Venice was probably 
to a great extent the effect of the abundance of spices at relatively low 
prices on the Levantine market, a factor which facilitated their marketing 
in Europe.”16 (Ashtor 1983: 312). At that moment, “the Moslem Levant 
was suffering from an economic depression; its economy was 
characterized by deflation and the impoverishment of broad sections of 
the population. The decline of prices of various commodities was a 
striking feature of the economic life, so that the European merchants, 
among whom the Venetians were most prominent, had to lower the prices 
                                                 
16 “Speaking of the year 1430, the chronicler Morosini says: “I would like to remark that 
for many years so much spice and other commodities had not come to Venice.” (cited 
from Ashtor 1983: 312). 
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of the European cloth they marketed in the Near East and to offer cheap 
articles. Almost all the data concerning the prices of European cloth sold 
in Egypt and Syria in that period point to a slow decline. The German 
cloth that the Venetians offered in the Moslem Levant was generally very 
cheap, and this was certainly also true of the Polish cloth. Another 
phenomenon of the Levant trade in that period was the spread of the use 
of English cloth” imported on a large scale in the second quarter of the 
15th century. (Ashtor 1983: 326). Note that the prices for the northern 
squirrel fur were also falling, as long as we consider the level of 
debasement. First, this produced a growth in trade volumes, aiming to 
compensate for losses, then a sharp drop.   
In a giant feedback loop, the deflation and depression of export-
driven countries of the periphery also curtailed the buying power of the 
European merchants. They gradually abandoned their earlier preferred 
basket of goods swapping it for a new basket of bulk-trade related and 
much more affordable goods.  
In the case of Russia the trend towards the market integration with 
the rapidly developing West can be seen through the fast disappearance 
of the lucrative, though extremely narrow-based, northern squirrel trade 
through Reval and Dorpat, which was central for Novgorod. It was 
replaced by a new fast growing trade in such items as cordage, tallow, 
train-oil etc, which were shipped-out from Arkhangelsk by the Dutch-
British merchants, providing around 60% of state revenues. Meanwhile, 
the relationships between Russian and Hanseatic merchants turned 
increasingly acrimonious, as the latter refused cash payments and forced 
acceptance of barter, while the former confiscated their goods as a 
retribution for the poor quality of their debased silver (Martin 1986: 82)17. 
Meanwhile, in a parallel development, the Italian galley-cog trade of the 
15th century would soon be superseded by the dominance of the rising 
                                                 
17 Dollinger 1970: 77, 294-5, Kazakova 1949, Khoroshkevich 1980 etc. 
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nation-state. First there came the European caravels, with the Portuguese 
controlling the base in Goa from 1510, travelling directly to Malacca in 
1511 and to the Moluccas in 1512-4, and capturing Hormuz in 1515. 
Expansion and the apogee of the Ottoman Empire (1453–1566) similarly 
applied the force of a rising nation-state from the opposite direction of the 
East. Synchronously, in the second half of the 15th century, Novgorod’s 
fur trade network disintegrated and its role crumbled. “Novgorod never 
fully recovered its position as the major fur centre of the Russian lands.” 
(Martin 1986: 84)   
 
 
II.  Debasement and Its Effects – Preliminary Results and 
Interpretation. 
  
Figure 5a. Debasement of the Prussian Mark 
Source: Volckart O. 2008 
 18
 
 
Figure 5b. Price Appreciation for Northern squirrel 1398-1404. 
Source of data: Martin J. 1986.   
Figure 5c. Price Appreciation for Northern squirrel (a Response to the 
Debasement of the Prussian Mark and Other Sources of German 
Silver?).  
 
Source: price estimates for the 1400s (1.4 dengas per pelt) provided in (Martin J. 1986) 
from various sources and the cash equivalent per pelt (3 dengas) as levied by the 
Muscovy tax assessments in the 1540s (Martin). Fitting these data (appreciation of 2.2 
for the period of about 150 years) produced the best approximation at about 0.5 per 
cent annual inflation rate. Of course, this is much lower than the rate of debasement of 
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the Prussian Mark of pic 5a. The latter was among the chief means of payment to the 
Novgorodian suppliers after the attempts to curtail the outflows of silver from the Hanse 
after 1379 (Khoroshkevich 1962: 302-307, 1961: 106 (She cites article 63 of a 14th 
century Hanseatic statute: “The penalty for providing silver to the Russians is one 
mark.” Despite these restrictions, she estimates the then inflows of German silver as 
significant.). The value of most Hanseatic silver coins fell spectacularly, from the 
fineness of about 96 to less than 16, about six-fold, until their use in coin form in 
Novgorod was banned in the 1420s. At the same time, the Venetian ducat held steady, 
at the same fineness and weight for nearly 500 years.    
 
The significant difference between the appreciation of squirrel 
(about 2.2 times in 150 years) and the fall in the value of the debased 
Prussian Mark (about six-fold in 150 years) shows that the prices were 
indeed quite sticky. The exporters absorbed the debased coin and the 
related losses of about threefold as long as they could. Of course, this 
was a heavy weight on their economy. Afterwards, the economic ruin 
coincided with a political disaster, where the Novgorodian suppliers, who 
lost their independence to the Muscovy in 1478, were joined by their 
worthwhile buyers from the Teutonic Order, absorbed into the Polish-
Lithuanian kingdom in 1525.    
Note that the dinar-denominated price closely correlates with the 
price movements in England as shown on Figure 4.  Ashtor notes that 
“the price of pepper, which had risen greatly from 1410, remained high in 
the 1420s. In 1423-1425 it even reached a new peak, viz. 120-130 dinars. 
Then from 1428 it went down and was 70-100 ashrafis the sporta until the 
1440s. The high price of pepper in the 1430s, however, was caused by 
the transactions of the sultan. When the commercial price was 70 
ashrafis, he compelled the Moslems and the Europeans to buy it for 100. 
In the fifth decade of the century, the price was very low, 50-60 ashrafis 
or even less… The prices of several other spices and aromata moved in 
the same direction: they went down in the middle of the fifteenth century.” 
(Ashtor 1983: 312, 316). 
To better appreciate the processes we need to take a look at the 
global scene. It turns out that the growth up to the 1300s stopped, 
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creating conditions for equilibrium, where mortality balanced a precarious 
equilibrium with wages and prices. Conditions of food supply/population 
equilibrium are supported by Postan Titow (1959) – post mid 13th century 
mortality and grain prices were shown as closely correlated. Below we 
cite Findlay, O’Rourke (2003: 15), where this hypothesis was thoroughly 
tested: 
 
“The economic and monetary consequences of the Black 
Death are worked out by means of a general equilibrium 
model with endogenous population, capital and commodity 
money supply in Findlay and Lundahl (2000) Real wages rise; 
population slowly recovers, driving real wages slowly down 
again; and an initial inflationary spike is followed by a long 
phase of deflation. The model postulates a demand for 
Eastern luxuries that rises with the higher per capita wealth 
and income, leading to an increased outflow of previous 
metals to the East and hence a prolonged monetary 
contraction.  
 
Then, they explain the major changes during this period: 
  
… Furthermore, this period of increased incomes and a 
higher demand for Asian luxury goods coincided with the 
demise of the Pax Mongolica and its associated overland 
trade, and a consequent reliance (once more) on traditional 
Indian Ocean trade routes and monopolistic Egyptian and 
Venetian intermediaries. Presumably, this increased the 
incentive to find a sea route to Asia. The result of all these 
changed incentives could well be a more modern society in 
1450 than in 1350. One that was ready to venture more 
readily and further abroad and to usher in a true era of 
globalization with the Voyages of discovery linking all the 
continents by sea”.  
 
This is supported by Miskimin (1975: 116). 
“By the beginning of the thirteenth century, trade had become 
more a way of life than uncertain adventure, and regular 
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institutions and trade routes had been devised by medieval 
merchants for their convenience and profit”.  
 
Thus, the data testifies that, at least for select categories of goods, 
the condition of shortages of supplies, felt acutely at the start of the 14th 
century, was already reversed, at least partly due to the growth of long 
distance trade, to the no less dire condition of shortages of demand 
around the mid fifteenth century. The graphs show, clearly and 
unequivocally, that the resource suppliers, despite their resistance, which, 
occasionally, took extreme forms of mutual violence, imprisonment etc, 
had acquiesced to the market reality. They accepted the conditions of the 
unrelenting debasement and absorbed its costs as the price of continuing 
their business. Since, in the cases of Novgorod and the Levant, the trade 
was highly specialized (fur against spices), their choice of buyers turned 
to be fairly limited. This is especially stark for the case of the Levant, 
where the sultan kept his ties with the Venetians through tightening the 
monopoly, while basically refusing to deal with the Catalans and other 
willing buyers, since they insisted on free markets outside of his control.     
An attempt to explain the underlying market forces brings us to the 
two main concepts of this study: “shortage of supply” and its opposite, 
”shortage of demand”. These were initially developed in the context of the 
19th and the 20th centuries, where the spread of the related phenomena 
also displayed surprisingly regular patterns (Badalian, Krivorotov 2009). 
Below, we use these concepts for interpretation of our preliminary results, 
trying to decipher processes revealed by the data. 
In a nutshell: The large oligopolistic bodies on the scale of the 
Hanse and Italian city-states rose and were wildly successful under lush 
conditions of shortages of supplies of the High Middle Ages and shortly 
thereafter. However, their own success contributed to their future demise 
and they faded, when, starting from the 15th century, the opposite 
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conditions of shortages of demand led to a price drop favouring the freer 
markets of the early nation-states.  
If we use terms of game theory, shortage of supplies presents a 
positive sum game, favouring cooperation – market segmentation under 
oligopolies. Equilibrium would amount to zero-sum game, the time of 
transition from positive sum game to negative sum game of shortages of 
demand, which favours cutthroat competition and freer markets. 
Perhaps, the contrast between shortages of supplies vs shortages 
of demand can be best illustrated through Eric Jones’ famous claim that 
economic history is “a tug of war between growth propensity and rent-
seeking.” He continues that “these propensities have switched economies 
between extensive growth and intensive growth.” (Jones 1988: 47). 
During the Late Middle Ages the medieval institutions of the rising bulk 
trade, such as the Hanseatic League, produced, at their start, a sharp rise 
in income levels. Among other things, the fur trade greatly increased the 
profitability of forested hinterlands of the Moscow princedom, which 
hardly could produce any adequate amounts of grain. Meanwhile, at the 
high point of 1384, Dmitry Donskoy’s taxes paid to the Golden Horde 
amounted to about 2 tons of grain from each Russian village, which, at 
that time, had only about 1 to 3 households. (Kuchkin 1991: 22). Perhaps, 
his inability to continue at this extremely high level contributed to the well 
documented problems of the Golden Horde, which entered the period of 
“great troubles” in 1359 and started to disintegrate from the 1420s.  
As highlighted by the debasement of the Prussian Mark in Figure 
5a, this was also a difficult period for the Novgorodian-Hanseatic 
relations, which served as the chief conduit for Russian silver intake at 
that time. As the trade gradually faded, there was also a sharp drop in the 
level of the Novgorodian taxes between the end of the 15th century, when 
the taxes still went to the Novgorodian Republic, and 1555, when 
Novgorod was already under the Muscovy rule. At the end, the economy 
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was sharply demonetized, with the Muscovy government promoting grain-
farming, previously a fringe occupation in this northern climate. The 
preliminary assessment registers the size of this drop as approaching 
25% (Martin 1986).  
The earlier monoculture-export-driven power, the Novgorodian 
Republic, started fading after experiencing a period of fast growth. While 
its development was quite intensive at the peak, its trading activities were 
gradually shifted to rent-seeking. For a while, territorial expansion served 
as the main means for supplying the surging volume of pelts for exports, 
until the market shifted and would take them no more. As its trade faded, 
Novgorod entered a series of wars, paying huge indemnities as listed in 
the footnote 1 until it was overrun by Muscovy in 1478. Novgorod, which 
kept its independence through the Mongol invasion and up, but then lost it 
along with its gushing source of revenues, was hardly alone. It was 
followed in its demise by its trading counterpart, the Teutonic Order, 
which was absorbed into the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom in 1525 as the 
Duchy of Prussia. The Levant, which clung to its spice trade, which 
evolved following the same scenario of first expansion in the volume in 
order to compensate for the falling prices and then a sharp drop, also fell 
to the Ottoman Empire in 1517.   
The switch from shortages of supplies to shortages of demand 
between the High and Late Middle Ages could have been started under 
the influence of the famine and the Black Death. However, it also 
produced a number of other consequences. Among other things, it 
appears that it drastically shifted the vector of transaction costs18 from 
oligopoly to freer competition, providing the latter with a winning edge 
after the fierce resistance of the earlier trade partners crumbled.  
                                                 
18 We understand vector of transaction costs as reflecting the entirety of all costs 
related to transactions. Below we’ll show that these are indeed different for rent-
seeking oligopolies as compared to growth seeking competitive entities.     
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Simultaneously, a switch to the intensified price competition 
promoted innovative industries, such as European textile making, 
especially at the lower end of the price range. Taken together, these 
developments provided their contribution to the rise of the modern nation-
state, able to provide valuable public goods (Jones), including such as 
maintenance and defence of extensive trade routes, both on the land and 
the sea. At this point of development, transaction costs were reduced due 
to the complete exclusion of various oligopolistic middlemen. Their mark-
ups were previously tolerated, up to a point, due to a valuable service 
they provided by connecting the consecutive interlocking segments of the 
larger market.  
 
1. Shortages of demand – chronologically, these became 
evident from the fifteenth century (Figure 1). In order to better 
appreciate the processes hinted at by our data, we must consider 
this situation as an economic phenomenon, played out in the 
macro-micro context. In this sense, the Late Middle Ages hardly 
differ from the modernity, since, in both cases, despite the stark 
variation, inefficiencies must be resolved in the same way, by 
reducing transaction costs.      
 
The condition of shortages of demand is basically nothing more or 
less than a creeping deflation, which might in fact evolve quite slowly. 
Traditionally, and up to our days, it is much dreaded as a precursor for a 
lengthy depression. In the negative-sum-game, a deflationary market 
tends to gradually wipe out the less efficient producers. The main 
challenge during a severe deflationary downturn is to create a better, 
more efficient market, with much lower transaction costs. The new line-up 
may include new types of companies and up to the rise of new and 
altogether different market institutions and industries. The main reason 
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why deflation stimulates such dramatic changes is the pressing need to 
survive within an unfolding deflationary spiral, forcing market participants 
to reduce transaction costs by lowering prices in any way possible, from 
purely technological to organizational and institutional. Any middlemen 
are ruthlessly eradicated as soon as this becomes possible, whether due 
to innovation (caravel vs galley/cog), organization (royal charter vs 
interlocking oligopolies, such as Hanse-Novgorod or Venice/Cairo), or a 
new configuration of trade routes (early modern nation-state vs late 
medieval cities with their restricted reach).   
Under the conditions of the globalizing market, transport, logistics, 
organization of deliveries, currency interchangeability, barriers of trade, 
information costs etc grow into a major part of the overall transaction 
costs. At this moment, the pattern of competition shifts. Now it unfolds not 
between individual producers or their guild-like unions, but rather 
countries and their respective institutions. In this way, globalization 
created a huge pressure on the extant institutions, forcing them to 
compete, while in segmented markets they could exist side to side 
relatively peacefully and cooperatively, regardless of their efficiency or the 
lack of thereof.  
For example, the Hanseatic League and the synchronous 
development of the Italian towns (Venice, Genoa etc) pursued 
monopolistic trade and divided their respective markets. Although divisive 
and at times combative, their cumulative role was immense, since, taken 
together, as interlocking entities, they greatly improved the overall market 
integration. For example, the ducat became the de-facto gold standard of 
the time, with other states minting comparable coin.  
However, this was only the initial stage. After creating a larger 
playing field, they could now be outcompeted by charter companies, more 
up to the growing scale of expanding bulk trade. In Coase’s terms, due to 
its flexibility, market becomes more profitable than hierarchies. Among 
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examples, “The English Muscovy Company [with its royal charter granted 
in 1555] was the single most important customer for Russian tar, which it 
used in the manufacture of cordage, its main export from Russia… The 
Dutch operated two similar enterprises, one at Kholmogory by the early 
1620s at the latest, and another at Arkhangel’sk in the early 1640s” (Arel 
2004: 177). Even though they were indeed state monopolies, they were 
first to create an open competitive market as a replacement to the earlier 
monopolistic unions, such as the Hanseatic League. (Arel 2004: 175-
203).  
The search for cost savings also ignited technological change, 
when old and well known designs were used in a brand new context, 
within new applications. Among examples is the caravel, a juxtaposition 
of several well known principles. Each of these came from a different 
predecessor ship: from the European carvel construction to the Arab 
lateen sail. As it evolved to the galleon and other large tonnage ships, 
their much longer range of travel led to great reductions in transport 
costs, an important part of global transaction costs. The drive to reduce 
overall transaction costs applied to information as well. Its costs were 
lowered more or less simultaneously and quite dramatically with the help 
of bookprinting. Naval charts, descriptions of currents etc, previously 
often the subject of commercial secret, were made both affordable and 
widely available. Meanwhile, the first printed book was the Bible, while the 
first recorded profits of Gutenberg came from printing the indulgencies, 
which highlights the circuitous nature of the path between the old and the 
new.   
Summarizing, efforts to reduce transaction costs at the time of 
globalization of the Late Middle Ages were developing in three major 
directions: 
•  Integration of the monetary market. 
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•  Creation of new institutions – charter companies appeared as a 
replacement for merchant unions, up to the rise of the nation-state, 
which granted and protected the royal charter. 
•  New transport infrastructure, including all the needed technology, 
from shipbuilding to bookprinting. We need to note that the early 
modern bulk trade, which first evolved on the Baltic and Northern 
Sea trade routes and spread further, up to the transatlantic trade, 
completely changed the global geometry. The initial portion of this 
infrastructure was completed by the Hanseatic League around the 
1500s. 
  
Meanwhile, this drastic reduction of transaction costs turned out 
much less innocent than it might have seemed at the first glance and 
initiated a cascade of changes. Charter companies needed state 
protection of their trading routes. This, in its turn, meant navies, standing 
armies, taxes, budgets and other institutions of a modern state19. At the 
end of the day, the trading space has been greatly expanded and such 
nation-states that were better able to support the related market 
institutions, especially such expensive ones as the standing army, gained 
a competitive edge over their weaker neighbours, including the Eastern 
Europe and the Levant.      
 
2. Shortages of supply – chronologically, these preceded 
shortages of demand and evolved from the end of the 12th century, 
becoming evident in the 13th century (Figures 1-2).  
 
                                                 
19 It is a well known fact that a regular standing army didn’t exist before the rise of the 
early modern state. For example, the Roman legion was first and foremost the 
centrepiece of the Roman economy, where its soldiers built the majority of modern 
European capitals as legion campsites.     
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In its pronounced forms, shortage of supplies implies a seller’s 
market. The supply of goods is inelastic and the price is established by 
the last item, which satisfies the urgent market needs. This leads to 
creeping inflation as the market is concentrated on assuring the 
procurement of the needed supplies at the price still acceptable for the 
market. Under these conditions, the market isn’t geared at picking the 
absolute winner. Instead, anyone with more or less suitable offers can be 
easily accommodated.  
However, the situation slowly and gradually deteriorates, as the 
resulting creeping inflation eats into profit margins. Up to a degree, the 
pressure of such an evolving inflationary spiral may be still mitigated, 
through the evolution of economies of scale. Participation in such a 
market implies the existence of a suitable market share, which must be 
guarded and protected at any cost. Thus, a seller doesn’t deal with a 
single item, but a flow of items, with transactions costs calculated for the 
entire flow. Obviously, the larger the flow, the lower per item costs – a 
sizable part of these costs would be thus devoted to getting and 
protecting one’s market share.  
Among expenses: sorting, quality maintenance, fraud protection 
etc. For example, in the case of the squirrel fur trade of the Hanseatic 
League with Novgorod, the Hanseatic buyers had to sort the furs 
according to the grade, which usually meant a discount (“naddacha”) for 
possible inferior furs, presumably hidden in the middle of the pack. Then, 
with the quality assured, they had to repack the furs into barrels etc, for 
the move to the end customer etc. They had to guard against 
trespassers, who might dump their goods etc as it indeed happened with 
the Novgorodian sellers, who brought excellent goods at a low price 
directly to the market and found no takers.   
As shown in the new trade theory, today, significant transaction 
costs related to building and maintaining a company’s market share force 
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towards development of economies of scale. In historical practice, to 
maintain and protect one’s market share various devices could and were 
in fact used, from the protection of one’s supply routes through such 
means as disinformation and up to militaristic actions, improvement of the 
desirability of the traded items to the end customer through brand-name 
creation and up to price collusion and shadowy agreements on to not 
infringing others’ markets. Such efforts, while quite expensive, might be 
still economically feasible (Krugman et al 1999). These considerations, 
developed for the case of modern markets, were also valid for the past, 
as long as an oligopolistic market segmentation and implicit or explicit 
price collusion could be supported by adequate levels of demand20. 
Obviously, this presumes more or less steady increases of cash flows – 
implying overall inflationary conditions of the market. In this positive sum 
game the market expansion pays for occasional inefficiencies as long as 
it is still possible to compensate for them. In the case of the high medieval 
Europe the continuing growth of the market was supported through 
various means: silver mining21 (first Saxon, then Bohemian, then 
Slovenian etc); coin debasements, especially evident from the 14th 
century, but which happened at the earlier dates as well; or speedier 
transactions through the circuit of fairs, which were up and running from 
the 12th century. All of these devises contributed to the swift growth of the 
                                                 
20 We need to stress that oligopolistic market segmentation can be observed up to our 
days in the developed economies as brand/market leader segmentation through select 
companies that, taken together, “make the market”. Meanwhile, price conspiracies are 
expressly prohibited by the law and there is extensive anti-monopoly legislation. Thus, 
modern oligopolies represent the dynamic equilibrium of various parameters, such as 
brandization, advertisement, goodwill, price wars, legal/patent battles etc, which, taken 
together, support company-wise market shares. 
21 In a lesser degree, gold mining, since gold was relatively unaffected by the spiralling 
debasement (Volckart). 
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high medieval economy and the surging demography in Europe for more 
than a century, from the 13th and up to the start of the 14th centuries22.  
The appearance of a wide range of new economic institutions 
during the period of the swift growth of the High Middle Ages is well 
documented. This includes such oligopolistic bodies as the Hanseatic 
League, Italian cities etc, which often had their distinct and mutually 
interlocking geopolitical areas and rarely infringed on others’ specialist 
turf. Their rise was facilitated by attempts at minimizing transaction costs 
under conditions of shortages of supplies characteristic for that period. 
Among popular devices used were: market segmentation, various 
medieval-style privileges, guild-like organizations etc. Under these 
conditions, such bodies as the Hanseatic League, lacking armies, could 
defy the king of Norway, using a trade blockade, since they controlled the 
grain market under the overall inflationary conditions of the High Middle 
Ages.  
In this sense, the growth of both the Hanse and the Italian cities 
was nothing if not the result of the work of “the invisible hand” in its 
attempt to connect supplies and sales in the most cost efficient way by 
cultivating interdependent monopolies. Of course, at the end, this attempt 
backfired, as bodies that grew to cope with shortages of supplies were 
suddenly faced with the opposite situation of shortages of demand, were 
found lacking and gradually faded, just as they grew, in interconnected 
pairs: Novgorod-Hanse, Venetians-Cairo. Ironically, their demise was an 
indirect result of their own earlier spectacular success in locating new far-
flung suppliers, monetizing new, previously unknown goods, and 
cultivating new, previously unheard-of needs. As the market expanded, it 
was gradually overstretched, and then, inevitably, flung to the direct 
                                                 
22 “… the secular rise of prices between say 1225 and 1345 proceeded at a rate not 
higher that 0.5 percent per annum”  (Postan, ??) (cited from Fischer p.17, endnote 9, 
pp 317-320) 
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opposite of a new and much ominous condition of shortages of demand. 
Its contribution to the start of the early modern era was described in detail 
above. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Despite its restricted scope, the preliminary analysis above shows 
the interconnections between the monetary centres and the economies of 
the resource-exporting periphery between the late Middle Ages and the 
Early Modern era. They grew and faded synchronously, after developing 
interlocked and highly specialized infrastructures of procurement and 
distribution, which proved to be overly dependent on the “good old days” 
of moderate inflationary conditions of the High Middle Ages. For a while, 
such conditions could be emulated during the much more tumultuous 
period of the Late Middle Ages through such means as oligopolistic price 
collusion and monetary debasement.  
Regardless of the initial motivation for debasement – princely greed 
or market need - it led to the expanding monetization of new arrays of 
goods from afar, which were brought to the market in a more or less 
efficient manner by the interlocked oligopolies. The related transaction 
costs were trimmed to a bearable level by developing economies of scale. 
For a while, this solution worked, contributing to occasional episodes of 
intensive growth. As the evidence shows, the resource suppliers 
grudgingly accepted the debased coins as long as the increases in the 
sales could compensate for their losses, which they absorbed. However, 
the related condition of the covert overproduction gradually worsened, 
eventually tilting the market pendulum (Badalian, Krivorotov 2009) 
towards a switch from shortages of supplies to shortages of demand. As 
shown above, this also started a cascade of events, eventually leading to 
the dawn of the early modern era. Just as the proponents of European 
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versus British-industrial point of view (O’Brien 2009, Jones 1988, Crafts 
1996) have stated, this was happening in Europe, at a much earlier date 
than the industrial era.  
Meanwhile, the system of the oligopolistic traders first grew, in 
response to conditions of shortages of supplies, and then collapsed, as 
they reversed to their opposite, conditions of shortages of demand, which 
they were ill equipped to handle. From the 17th century, instead, there 
was the new world of the early modern nation-states. They cut off the 
middlemen, replacing them with their royal charter companies. This was 
the end of a long process. Starting from the second half of the 15th 
century, the deflationary spiral evolved slowly but steadily. Its squeeze 
caused a switch in the basket of preferred goods, drastically lowering 
their costs, while no less drastically increasing the volumes. At the end, 
even the American gold and silver proved inadequate for monetizing the 
resulting immense array of highly competitive goods. The defaults of the 
Spanish crown were highly public. The monetary system was at the end 
stabilized, using new and utterly revolutionary means designed by the 
Amsterdam bankers. The latter created the foundation for the modern 
banking, which, finally, was adequate to the size of the new subject on 
the scene – the young nation-state.   
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